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Deep Dive

Deep Dive

Node2Shell: Brotli RCE in Node.js, Bun and Python (CVE-2026-111497)

CVE-2026-111497 (CVSS v4.0 9.2): Brotli decoder overflow in Node.js, Bun, .NET, Python, Envoy and Istio, now in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.

TL;DR

  • CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the C Brotli decoder, the code that unpacks Brotli-compressed (Content-Encoding: br) data across the web. A crafted stream corrupts process memory, causing a crash, memory disclosure, or code execution. The CVE record rates it CVSS v4.0 9.2 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N); Node.js rates it High and Red Hat rates it 8.1.
  • The bug lives in Google Brotli 1.0.3 through 1.2.0 and travels into everything that bundles that code: Node.js 22.x, 24.x and 26.x, Bun 1.4.3 and earlier, the PyPI Brotli and brotlicffi packages, Envoy and Istio when Brotli decompression is enabled, cdxgen standalone builds, and the .NET runtime, fixed October 25 across .NET 8 through the .NET 11 release candidates.
  • Exposure requires decoding Brotli data someone else controls: a fetch() response, an Express 5 or body-parser 2 request body, a proxy decompression filter, or Python HTTP clients, which decode Brotli automatically once the package is installed.
  • CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on October 27, 2026, with federal agencies due to patch by November 10. A KEV listing requires evidence of active exploitation.
  • ELLIO's sensors recorded an exploitation attempt against Node.js on October 26; when ELLIO replayed the attacker's chain in its lab, it crashed the process but never reached code execution.
  • ELLIO separately reproduced a shell on the official, unmodified Node.js 24.22.0 x86-64 build, against a plain node:http server whose handler calls node:zlib directly, the node:24.22.0-slim image, Express 5.3.0 and Koa 3. Exploitation-intelligence firm Previdian recorded an exploitation attempt on its sensors on October 27, 2026, and a public exposure checker is mapping which hosts decompress Brotli.
  • Update every copy of the decoder now, then restart services and rebuild container images: a running process keeps the old decoder until it restarts.

Am I affected?

You are affected if both of these hold:

  • Software you run bundles or links the Brotli decoder in an affected version, and it decodes Brotli data from parties you do not fully control. A plain Node.js HTTP server does not decode request bodies on its own, so exposure comes through the paths listed below.
  • For Python specifically, the risk comes from the Brotli or brotlicffi package being installed at all. Once either is present, HTTP clients such as requests, urllib3, httpx and aiohttp decode Brotli responses on their own, so an application can be exposed without ever importing Brotli in its own code.
Software Affected versions Fixed version
Google Brotli (C library) 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 1.0.10, 1.1.1 or 1.2.1, per branch (October 21, 2026)
Node.js 26.x before 26.12.1 26.12.1 (October 21, 2026)
Node.js 24.x before 24.22.1 24.22.1 (October 21, 2026)
Node.js 22.x before 22.23.4 22.23.4 (October 21, 2026)
Node.js 20.x and older all (end of life) none: move to a supported line
Bun 1.4.3 and earlier 1.4.4 (October 22, 2026)
.NET 8 8.0.0 to 8.0.32 8.0.33 (October 25, 2026)
.NET 9 9.0.0 to 9.0.21 9.0.22 (October 25, 2026)
.NET 10 10.0.0 to 10.0.13 10.0.14 (October 25, 2026)
.NET 11 previews and RCs 11.0.0-preview.1 to 11.0.0-rc.3.26522.147 11.0.0-rc.3.26522.148
PyPI Brotli before 1.2.1 1.2.1
PyPI brotlicffi before 1.2.1.0 1.2.1.0
Perl XS::libbrotli (CPAN) before 1.2.1.0, bundling Brotli 1.0.7 or 1.1.0 1.2.1.0 (October 29, 2026)
Go, andybalholm/brotli before 1.2.7 1.2.7 (October 23, 2026)
Envoy 1.36.11, 1.37.7, 1.38.5, 1.39.2 1.36.12, 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3, 1.40.0
Istio 1.29.0 to 1.29.8, 1.30.0 to 1.30.5, 1.31.0 to 1.31.1 1.29.9, 1.30.6, 1.31.2
cdxgen standalone binaries and images 13.4.0 and earlier, 12.8.8 and earlier 13.5.0, 12.8.9
PHP official Windows builds 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 of October 21, 2026 (bundled Brotli 1.2.0, per the build SBOMs) 8.5.12-1, 8.4.27-1, 8.3.36-1 and 8.2.35-1, the October 26 rebuilds bundling Brotli 1.2.1

The .NET advisory, GHSA-p3jp-9v83-76w9 (High, CVSS v3.1 8.1), covers 225 NuGet packages across the four release lines and carries the same precondition as the proxies: ASP.NET Core and HttpClient do not automatically decompress Brotli data in their default configurations, so a .NET application is exposed only when it enables Brotli decompression or explicitly uses BrotliStream, BrotliDecoder or the automatic-decompression options on attacker-controlled data. .NET Framework is not affected.

The Go port of the decoder, andybalholm/brotli, carried the same conflated return in its decodeBlockTypeAndLength, and Andy Balholm fixed it on October 23, 2026 with commit 33c2a988, a direct port of the Google fix 0ed4268, released as v1.2.7 with no advisory and no CVE. The scope is narrower than the C decoder's: Go's bounds-checked slice accesses turn the out-of-range block-type index into a panic rather than a silent out-of-bounds write, so the failure mode in Go is a crash on attacker-supplied input, not the memory corruption the C library allows. Go services that decompress attacker-supplied Brotli should still move to 1.2.7 or later.

Beyond the table, projects that compile their own copy of the decoder inherit the bug until they update it, and a community tracker follows them. Fixed by October 24: the Ruby brotli gem 0.9.1, the PHP brotli extension 0.21.1 and UEFITool A76, all bundling Brotli 1.2.1, plus MuPDF 1.28.x, whose Brotli fork picked the fix up in April. Still without a fixed release as of October 27: ClickHouse, NanaZip, GraalJS (graal-nodejs), YDB and libjxl, which have the fix merged on their main branches but whose latest releases still bundle an affected decoder. Apache Arrow merged its C++ change that forces newer Brotli versions, pull request #55167, on October 29, 2026.

Perl has another bundled copy to check: upgrading the system Brotli does not remediate XS::libbrotli. XS::libbrotli, the CPAN distribution that builds the decoder for Perl's XS modules, compiles a bundled Brotli 1.0.7 or 1.1.0 into static archives that dependent modules link against at build time, rather than using the system library. The CPAN Security Group published this as CVE-2026-115946 on October 31, 2026 and states the exposure runs through any dependent module that decompresses untrusted data: a crafted stream can corrupt decoder state, disclose memory, crash the process, or potentially execute arbitrary code. Version 1.2.1.0, released October 29, 2026, updates the bundle to Brotli 1.2.1.

One bundled copy arrived late and is worth naming precisely, because a version check will not catch it. PHP's official Windows builds of the October 21 security releases, 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35, carried Brotli 1.2.0 in their software bill of materials, and the cURL extension can reach it when an application turns on automatic decompression of HTTP responses, which the PHP Foundation notes cURL leaves off by default but applications and HTTP client libraries can enable. On October 26 the PHP team rebuilt all four as 8.5.12-1, 8.4.27-1, 8.3.36-1 and 8.2.35-1 with Brotli 1.2.1; the PHP source is unchanged, so php -v prints the same version before and after, and the rebuild is identified only by the -1 suffix in the package name and the SHA-256 on the downloads page. Guzzle is the client library that meets the exposure condition out of the box: its cURL handler sets CURLOPT_ENCODING to an empty value whenever the decode_content option is not false, per its source in 7.16.1 and 8.3.1, and an empty value tells cURL to accept and decompress every encoding it supports.

Envoy and Istio are affected when Brotli decompression is explicitly enabled, for example through an Envoy decompressor filter. Where it is off, the flaw cannot be reached.

Check what you run, on hosts, in containers and in CI images:

node --version && node -p "process.versions.brotli"   # Node.js: runtime and bundled decoder
bun --version                                          # Bun 1.4.4+ is fixed
python -m pip show Brotli brotlicffi 2>/dev/null | grep -E '^(Name|Version)'
envoy --version                                        # only meaningful with decompression enabled
istioctl version
curl -V | grep -o 'brotli/[0-9.]*'                     # brotli library linked into curl, e.g. brotli/1.1.0
go list -m all | grep brotli                           # Go: andybalholm/brotli 1.2.7+ is fixed

For Node.js, the lock file does not answer the question: applications decode Brotli through the built-in node:zlib module, which uses the decoder bundled in the runtime, so the Node.js version above is the check. The npm brotli package is a separate JavaScript port used for WOFF2 fonts, not the C decoder, and its presence or absence in package-lock.json says nothing about exposure. For Python, pinned requirements do matter:

grep -iE '^(brotli|brotlicffi)' requirements.txt

The PyPI Brotli package recorded about 82.8 million downloads a month, so this dependency is widespread in application and CI stacks.

How do I fix it?

Update the decoder everywhere it lives, then restart the process and rebuild any container image: the running process keeps its old decoder in memory until it restarts.

  • Node.js: update to 26.12.1, 24.22.1 or 22.23.4 from the October 21, 2026 security releases. Node.js 20.x is end of life and will not receive the fix; move those deployments to a supported line.
  • Bun: update to 1.4.4, released October 22, 2026.
  • Python: pip install --upgrade Brotli brotlicffi to reach 1.2.1 and 1.2.1.0, and rebuild images that pin either package.
  • Perl: upgrade XS::libbrotli to 1.2.1.0 or later, for example cpanm XS::libbrotli, then reinstall every XS module that was built against the old static archive, per the CPAN advisory. Upgrading the system Brotli does not fix the bundled copy.
  • Go: update andybalholm/brotli to 1.2.7 or later in any service that decompresses attacker-supplied Brotli.
  • .NET: update to 8.0.33, 9.0.22, 10.0.14 or 11.0.0-rc.3.26522.148. Exposure needs Brotli decompression explicitly enabled or the Brotli APIs used on attacker-controlled data; .NET Framework is not affected. Self-contained and NativeAOT deployments carry their own copy of the runtime, so updating the machine's shared runtime does not fix them: rebuild and redeploy self-contained applications with the updated runtime, and republish NativeAOT applications with the patched SDK. Per the community tracker, the public GitHub branches had not yet caught up with the internal fix, so source builds from GitHub remained affected.
  • Envoy and Istio: update to the fixed releases in the table if Brotli decompression is enabled in your configuration.
  • Google Brotli, if you build against it directly: 1.0.10, 1.1.1 or 1.2.1 per your branch.
  • PHP on Windows: install the -1 rebuilds, 8.5.12-1, 8.4.27-1, 8.3.36-1 or 8.2.35-1, from the PHP downloads page and verify the SHA-256, since php -v cannot distinguish them from the October 21 builds. Until you rebuild, the PHP-side workaround is to stop automatic decompression: do not set CURLOPT_ENCODING, and in Guzzle set the decode_content request option to false, which stops all automatic decoding, so gzip responses also arrive compressed.
  • curl and other tools that link the system library: update the operating system package. Debian fixed brotli 1.1.0 for Debian 13 (trixie) on October 23, 2026 as 1.1.0-2+deb13u1; Amazon Linux 2023 still listed its brotli and Node.js 24 packages as pending a fix as of October 22, 2026, so check your distribution's status.

If you cannot update yet, stop decoding untrusted Brotli. The recommendations from OpenAI's disclosure page and from Aikido:

  • Reject incoming requests carrying Content-Encoding: br before any proxy or parser decodes the body.
  • Turn off automatic Brotli decoding in HTTP clients, and reject Brotli responses before they are decoded.
  • In Python, uninstall the Brotli and brotlicffi packages so clients fall back to gzip and deflate.

State the limits plainly. Dropping br from the Accept-Encoding header does not help on its own, because a server can send Brotli whatever the client asked for. For Node.js itself, no general workaround has been published, so updating the runtime is the only fix. One inbound path can be closed in the meantime: Express 5 and body-parser 2 parsers set with inflate: false reject any compressed request body with a 415 error before decompressing it, but this does nothing for fetch() responses or other code that decodes Brotli. A web application firewall helps only partially: Vercel, which shipped firewall rules on disclosure day, states that the rules do not cover "responses your functions fetch from other servers", a path only the runtime update closes.

What is the root cause?

The decoder reported a permanent format error as a recoverable "need more input" condition, and the fast decoding path discarded even that, so decoding continued past a point where it should have stopped and wrote outside an internal buffer. The flaw is in DecodeBlockTypeAndLength in c/dec/decode.c, and the fix, commit 0ed4268 by Evgenii Kliuchnikov on February 27, 2026, makes the mechanics visible.

Before the fix, the function returned BROTLI_BOOL, the library's boolean. BROTLI_FALSE meant two very different things: a malformed stream, and an incomplete read that more input could fix:

 static BROTLI_INLINE BROTLI_BOOL DecodeBlockTypeAndLength(
     int safe, BrotliDecoderState* s, int tree_type) {
   ...
   if (max_block_type <= 1) {
-    return BROTLI_FALSE;

max_block_type <= 1 means the stream declares a single block type, so a block-switch command at this point is invalid input, not a paused read. The caller could not tell the two cases apart. In the streaming path, Node.js describes the consequence: "an invalid block switch was reported as a temporary need for more input instead of a permanent format error, so the streaming decoder kept appending input bytes to an eight-byte internal buffer."

In the fast path, the result was discarded altogether. The unsafe variant of the literal block switch was declared void, so the failure never reached the caller:

-static void BROTLI_NOINLINE DecodeLiteralBlockSwitch(BrotliDecoderState* s) {
-  DecodeLiteralBlockSwitchInternal(0, s);

The BROTLI_SAFE macro, used at the three block-switch call sites, checks the result in the speculative safe mode and ignores it in unsafe mode. The fix adds the comment that says so outright: "in case of 'unsafe' execution, when input is guaranteed to be sufficient, result is ignored." That guarantee held for well-formed streams, not for one carrying an invalid block switch, so the fast path kept decoding with stale block-type ring-buffer and Huffman-tree state, and subsequent writes landed past the end of their buffer. The GitHub advisory for the flaw tags CWE-252, an unchecked return value, and the overflow itself is CWE-787, an out-of-bounds write.

How is it exploited?

The attack needs one delivery route where the target decompresses Brotli the attacker controls, then one crafted stream. Numbered:

  1. The attacker builds a Brotli stream that reaches DecodeBlockTypeAndLength with a block-switch command while the stream declares only one block type for that tree.
  2. The stream is delivered as a Content-Encoding: br response to a fetch() call, as a Brotli-compressed request body parsed by Express 5 or body-parser 2, through an Envoy or Istio decompression filter, or as a response decoded automatically by a Python HTTP client with Brotli installed.
  3. The invalid block switch returns BROTLI_FALSE. The streaming path reads it as "feed me more bytes"; the fast path drops it. In both, decoding continues instead of rejecting the stream.
  4. Decoding with stale block-type state writes attacker-influenced data past the end of an internal decoder buffer, corrupting adjacent process memory.
  5. The corruption crashes the process, discloses memory, or redirects execution. Imperva's Red Team, calling its work Node2Shell, ran attacker-supplied code on an unmodified Node.js 24.22.0 build for Linux on ARM64, delivering the payload both as a fetched response and as an Express request body. ELLIO's Threat Research Team then reproduced the same chain on x86-64 with public tooling, against four targets running the official Node.js 24.22.0 binaries under default configuration with address space layout randomization left on: a plain node:http server whose handler calls node:zlib directly, the official node:24.22.0-slim image running as root, Express 5.3.0 and Koa 3. Each returned a shell as the service's own account.

OpenAI's Codex Security team, which reported the flaw, describes the exposure as working in both directions: "an unpatched server that accepts compressed input could be taken over by a malicious client, and an unpatched client that accepts compressed input (such as 'curl --compressed') could be taken over by a malicious server."

How does the attack flow?

The flow is short: deliver a crafted stream through any Brotli decode path, let the conflated error keep the decoder alive past an invalid block switch, and the writes that follow land outside the buffer.

flowchart LR A["Crafted Brotli stream with an
invalid block-switch command"] --> B["Delivered via fetch response,
request body or proxy filter"] B --> C["Decoder hits the invalid switch:
format error, not missing input"] C --> D["TRUE or FALSE boolean conflates
the two: error reporting fails"] D --> E["Fast path discards the result
and keeps decoding"] E --> F["Stale block-type state drives
writes past the buffer end"] F --> G["Crash, memory disclosure
or code execution"]

What can an attacker do?

  • Crash the decoding process. A denial of service is the most reliable outcome, since heap corruption frequently crashes before anything else happens.
  • Disclose process memory. Adjacent decoder state and heap contents can leak through the corrupted decode results.
  • Execute code. Imperva demonstrated this on one Node.js ARM64 build and ELLIO on four x86-64 targets running Node.js 24.22.0, in both cases with several attempts: reliability depends on the process's heap layout, and ELLIO measured roughly five attempts with address space layout randomization enabled on a quiet service. Per-build targeting is required; ELLIO reports that the memory offset that gave a shell on 24.22.0 produced nothing against 22.23.3 or 26.12.0 in 10,000 attempts.
  • Compromise clients as well as servers. An unpatched client that decodes Brotli from a malicious or compromised server is exposed the same way, a path most server-side hardening does not touch.

Conditions the attacker needs: a decode path for attacker-controlled Brotli, as listed above, and nothing else. No authentication beyond the carrying HTTP exchange, and no user interaction for server-side decoding.

Why does the fix work?

Commit 0ed4268, "Detect and report invalid stream earlier", rebuilds the error handling so the two states stop collapsing into one boolean:

  • DecodeBlockTypeAndLength now returns BrotliDecoderErrorCode, a tri-state: success, a hard error, or needs-more-input.
  • The invalid block-switch case returns a new permanent error, BROTLI_DECODER_ERROR_FORMAT_BLOCK_SWITCH, error code -17, which the header previously left as "reserved".
  • The incomplete-read cases return BROTLI_DECODER_NEEDS_MORE_INPUT distinctly, so the streaming loop keeps its legitimate resume behavior.
  • A new BROTLI_SAFE_WITH_STATUS macro checks the status in both safe and unsafe paths and jumps to saveStateAndReturn on failure, so the fast path can no longer ignore a block-switch error:
+#define BROTLI_SAFE_WITH_STATUS(METHOD)         \
+  {                                             \
+    BrotliDecoderErrorCode status;              \
+    if (safe) {                                 \
+      status = Safe##METHOD;                    \
+    } else {                                    \
+      status = METHOD;                          \
+    }                                           \
+    if (status != BROTLI_DECODER_SUCCESS) {     \
+      result = status;                          \
+      goto saveStateAndReturn;                  \
+    }                                           \
+  }

The three block-switch call sites now use the status-checking macro, and the patch adds a debug assertion on the meta-block length invariant. The fix is complete for this flaw: an invalid block switch is now a permanent, reported error on every path.

The deployment lesson matters as much as the code. The fix landed in google/brotli's source on February 27, 2026, and no Brotli release carried it until October 21, 2026. OpenAI's account: the root cause "was actually fixed in the Brotli source code in February, but it wasn't known at the time that it gave rise to a security vulnerability and there was no more recent release of Brotli." Every runtime and package then had to ship its own copy of the fix in October, which is why the fixed versions above span three days and eight ecosystems.

How do I check if I was compromised?

Hunt for two attack indicators ELLIO published: a 23,069,983-byte Content-Encoding: br request body (SHA-256 7fcbdaaecd4419e2930927844f3b772668204737a4e7602a2290c991c93c5c4b) and source IP 94.154.43[.]7, both observed October 26, 2026. CISA added CVE-2026-111497 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on October 27, 2026. The two indicators, plus the public scanner that probes for exposure:

  • SHA-256 7fcbdaaecd4419e2930927844f3b772668204737a4e7602a2290c991c93c5c4b: a single 23,069,983-byte Brotli-coded HTTP request body (Content-Encoding: br), observed October 26, 2026 at 15:08 UTC.
  • Source IP 94.154.43[.]7: an address ELLIO rates malicious with high confidence, also tied to PHP2Shell exploitation, GlobalProtect and FortiOS SSL VPN probing, and Kubernetes API scanning.
  • Scanner node2shell-check, User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; node2shell-check/1.0): a public exposure checker mapping which hosts decompress Brotli by sending POST bodies carrying Content-Encoding: br.

The body was built to attack Node.js v24.22.0 on x86-64 specifically. Its delivery layer is a byte-for-byte copy of the public proof-of-concept tooling. Its final ROP chain is an original construction: in ELLIO's 50-attempt test against a pristine vulnerable target, it pivoted and crashed the process but never reached code execution. Treat observed traffic as attempted exploitation.

What to hunt for in logs and telemetry:

  • Clusters of crashes in Node.js, Bun, Envoy or Istio processes that handle Brotli-encoded traffic.
  • Memory-content anomalies in crash dumps from those processes.
  • If code execution did occur on a host, the usual process-level artifacts: unexpected child processes and outbound connections.

Any such finding on a Brotli-decoding path is worth treating as related until proven otherwise. The response is the standard one for suspected code execution: isolate, snapshot, rotate credentials reachable from the process, and rebuild from a clean image.

Timeline

  • 2026-02-27: commit 0ed4268 lands in google/brotli with the fix; no release follows, and the security impact is not yet recognized.
  • 2026-10-21: Node.js ships 26.12.1, 24.22.1 and 22.23.4, and google/brotli publishes 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1.
  • 2026-10-22: CVE-2026-111497 published with the CVSS v4.0 9.2 rating; Bun 1.4.4 released; GitHub advisory GHSA-9v8h-qqgm-4m35 published for the Python packages.
  • 2026-10-23: Imperva's Node2Shell demonstration reported; CISA records no exploitation; the GitHub advisory is updated to map pip brotli below 1.2.1 and brotlicffi below 1.2.1.0; Debian fixes trixie's brotli package; PYSEC-2026-4322 and PYSEC-2026-4323 are added; Andy Balholm ports the fix to the Go decoder as commit 33c2a988 and releases it as andybalholm/brotli v1.2.7.
  • 2026-10-24: cross-ecosystem affected matrices published.
  • 2026-10-25: Microsoft publishes the .NET advisory GHSA-p3jp-9v83-76w9, fixing 225 NuGet packages across .NET 8, 9, 10 and the 11 release candidates; the community tracker records the Ruby brotli gem, PHP brotli extension and UEFITool fixes of October 24.
  • 2026-10-25: ELLIO reproduces code execution on the official Node.js 24.22.0 x86-64 build with the public tooling and publishes the analysis.
  • 2026-10-26: PHP rebuilds its official Windows packages as 8.5.12-1, 8.4.27-1, 8.3.36-1 and 8.2.35-1 with Brotli 1.2.1, five days after the October 21 builds shipped with Brotli 1.2.0 in their SBOMs.
  • 2026-10-26: ELLIO's sensors record the first in-the-wild exploitation attempt ELLIO has reported, a 23 MB single-target body from 94.154.43[.]7 pairing the public proof-of-concept delivery layer with an original ROP chain against Node.js v24.22.0.
  • 2026-10-27: CISA adds CVE-2026-111497 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog with a federal due date of November 10, 2026, superseding its October 23 assessment of "none".
  • 2026-10-27: exploitation-intelligence firm Previdian records one exploitation attempt on its sensors, without evidence that the target was vulnerable or that the attempt succeeded.
  • 2026-10-27: this post is updated with the PHP Windows rebuilds, the Guzzle exposure condition and the Apache Arrow status.
  • 2026-10-28: this post is updated with the KEV listing, ELLIO's in-the-wild indicators, the Previdian sensor observation and the public node2shell-check exposure scanner.
  • 2026-10-29: XS-libbrotli 1.2.1.0 releases on CPAN, updating the decoder bundled for Perl XS modules to Brotli 1.2.1. Apache Arrow merges its C++ change forcing newer Brotli versions.
  • 2026-10-31: the CPAN Security Group publishes CVE-2026-115946 for the Perl bundled copy.

FAQ

Is a plain Node.js HTTP server exposed?

A plain Node.js server does not decode request bodies on its own. It is exposed when it parses Brotli request bodies through Express 5 or body-parser 2, when it calls fetch() and decodes a Content-Encoding: br response, or when its own code passes untrusted data to zlib.brotliDecompress(), zlib.createBrotliDecompress() or the other node:zlib Brotli APIs, for example in a WebSocket handler, an RPC stream or a file-processing pipeline. ELLIO's plain node:http target returned a shell because its handler called node:zlib itself, with no framework or body parser in front of the decoder. If none of these paths exists in your code, the runtime is still worth updating on schedule.

Does dropping br from Accept-Encoding protect my clients?

No. A server can send Brotli whatever the client asked for, and Python clients decode Brotli automatically once the package is installed. Turn off automatic Brotli decoding in the client configuration, reject Brotli responses before they are decoded, or uninstall the Python packages so clients fall back to gzip and deflate.

Why did the fix take from February to October to reach users?

The change landed in google/brotli's source on February 27, 2026, but the project published no release after that date until the October security response, and the security impact of the change was not known at the time. Runtimes that vendor the decoder, including Node.js and Bun, could not pick the fix up until a release existed to vendor.

Will my dependency scanner flag the Python packages?

The GitHub advisory now maps pip brotli below 1.2.1 and brotlicffi below 1.2.1.0, updated on October 23, 2026, and the PYSEC-2026-4322 and PYSEC-2026-4323 entries exist, so database-syncing tooling can flag them. Stale or air-gapped tooling may lag behind those updates, so checking the installed versions manually, as above, is the reliable test this week.

Are Envoy and Istio exposed by default?

No. Both are affected when Brotli decompression is explicitly enabled, for example through an Envoy decompressor filter. If your configuration never decompresses Brotli, the flaw is unreachable; if it does, the fixed versions in the table apply.

What about curl and other system tools?

curl and many other tools link the operating system's Brotli library rather than bundling it. curl -V shows the linked version, for example brotli/1.1.0. Update through the distribution: Debian shipped trixie's fixed package on October 23, 2026, and other distributions are shipping on their own schedules.

Find the old decoder before an attacker does

Scan your repositories, container images and internet-facing services with Ostorlab to surface every Node.js, Bun and Python deployment still bundling a Brotli decoder from before the October 21, 2026 fixes.

References

  • CVE-2026-111497 record with the CVSS v4.0 9.2 vector and the 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 affected range: https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-111497 (checked October 25, 2026)
  • Node.js October 21, 2026 security releases, with the per-flaw description, affected lines, fixed versions and credits (reporters Khai Tran and Sylvie Mayer of OpenAI Codex Security; fixers Matteo Collina and Antoine du Hamel): https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/october-2026-security-releases (checked October 25, 2026)
  • Fix commit 0ed4268, "Detect and report invalid stream earlier", Evgenii Kliuchnikov, February 27, 2026: https://github.com/google/brotli/commit/0ed4268 (checked October 25, 2026)
  • google/brotli releases 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1, published October 21, 2026: https://github.com/google/brotli/releases (checked October 25, 2026)
  • GHSA-9v8h-qqgm-4m35, reviewed advisory mapping pip brotli and brotlicffi, with CWE-252: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9v8h-qqgm-4m35 (checked October 25, 2026; PyPI mapping added by the October 23, 2026 update)
  • Bun 1.4.4 release, October 22, 2026: https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/tag/bun-v1.4.4 (checked October 25, 2026)
  • andybalholm/brotli fix commit 33c2a988, "Detect and report invalid stream earlier", a port of the Google fix, October 23, 2026, released as v1.2.7: https://github.com/andybalholm/brotli/commit/33c2a988 and https://github.com/andybalholm/brotli/releases/tag/v1.2.7 (checked October 26, 2026)
  • Microsoft's .NET advisory GHSA-p3jp-9v83-76w9, CVE-2026-111497, 225 NuGet packages fixed in 8.0.33, 9.0.22, 10.0.14 and 11.0.0-rc.3.26522.148, with the automatic-decompression precondition and the .NET-Framework-not-affected statement: https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/security-advisories/GHSA-p3jp-9v83-76w9 and https://github.com/dotnet/announcements/issues/494 (checked October 26, 2026)
  • The Broccoli2Shell community tracker for bundled copies and per-project fix state: https://broccoli2shell.com/ (checked October 28, 2026)
  • Envoy advisory GHSA-3wvj-j6qm-62mr: https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-3wvj-j6qm-62mr (checked October 25, 2026)
  • Istio security advisory 2026-007: https://istio.io/latest/news/security/istio-security-2026-007/ (checked October 25, 2026)
  • cdxgen advisory GHSA-5266-jm88-3grm: https://github.com/cdxgen/cdxgen/security/advisories/GHSA-5266-jm88-3grm (checked October 25, 2026)
  • The Hacker News, "Brotli Decoder Flaw Behind Node.js RCE Also Affects Bun, Python and Other Widely Used Software", October 24, 2026, with the affected matrix, the OpenAI bidirectional quote, the CISA and Red Hat assessments and the workaround recommendations: https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/brotli-decoder-flaw-behind-nodejs-rce.html (checked October 25, 2026)
  • The Hacker News on Imperva's Node2Shell demonstration, October 23, 2026: https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/researchers-demonstrate-node2shell-rce.html (checked October 25, 2026)
  • ELLIO Threat Research Lab, "Node2Shell: remote code execution on stock Node.js builds (CVE-2026-111497)", October 25, 2026, with the October 26 in-the-wild update, the observed body hash and the source IP: https://ellio.tech/en/blog/node2shell-cve-2026-111497-rce-on-stock-nodejs-builds/ (read in full October 28, 2026)
  • CISA KEV entry for CVE-2026-111497, added October 27, 2026, due November 10, 2026: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog (checked October 28, 2026)
  • The Hacker News, "Adobe Commerce PolyShell Attacks Breach Hundreds of Stores as Brotli Exploit Traffic Emerges", October 28, 2026, for the Previdian sensor observation: https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/adobe-commerce-polyshell-attacks-breach.html (read in full October 28, 2026)
  • Previdian, "CVE-2026-111497 Exploitation Attempts Observed", the exploitation-intelligence firm's sensor record of one attempt, first observed October 27, 2026: https://previdian.com/CVE-2026-111497 (checked October 28, 2026)
  • OpenAI's disclosure page for the flaw, patchtheplanet.org: https://patchtheplanet.org/brotli (referenced via The Hacker News, October 24, 2026; the page does not render as static text from this environment)
  • Red Hat's CVE assessment, rating 8.1 and noting no public, reliable remote code execution proof of concept, a statement that predates ELLIO's October 25 reproduction with public tooling: https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-111497 (referenced via The Hacker News, October 24, 2026)
  • Vercel's Node.js security bulletin on the limits of its firewall rules: https://vercel.com/kb/bulletin/node-js-security-advisory (referenced via The Hacker News, October 24, 2026)
  • Debian security announce for brotli 1.1.0-2+deb13u1, October 23, 2026: https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2026/msg00498.html (referenced via The Hacker News, October 24, 2026)
  • PyPI download statistics for Brotli, about 82.8 million per month: https://pypistats.org/packages/brotli (checked October 25, 2026)
  • Aikido's analysis of the Python package exposure and workarounds: https://www.aikido.dev/blog/python-packages-vulnerable-node2shell-brotli-cve-2026-111497 (referenced via The Hacker News, October 24, 2026)
  • PHP Foundation, "Updated PHP Windows builds for Brotli security fix", October 26, 2026: the -1 rebuilds of 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 with Brotli 1.2.1, the cURL automatic-decompression reachability and the -1 suffix meaning: https://www.php.net/archive/2026.php#2026-10-26-1 (checked October 27, 2026)
  • The Hacker News, "PHP Issues Second Windows Security Update in Five Days to Fix Brotli Code Execution Flaw", October 26, 2026, with the SBOM evidence of Brotli 1.2.0 in the October 21 builds, the Guzzle default-setting finding against its 7.16.1 and 8.3.1 source, and the OpenAI workaround advice: https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/php-issues-second-windows-security.html (checked October 27, 2026)
  • Guzzle cURL handler source, 7.16.1, src/Handler/CurlFactory.php, setting CURLOPT_ENCODING to an empty value unless decode_content is false: https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/blob/7.16.1/src/Handler/CurlFactory.php (checked October 27, 2026)
  • Apache Arrow pull request #55167, "GH-55165: [C++][Packaging][R] Use Brotli 1.2.1 for bundled, vcpkg and R Windows builds", merged October 29, 2026: https://github.com/apache/arrow/pull/55167 (checked November 1, 2026)
  • CVE-2026-115946 record, CPAN Security Group CNA, the XS::libbrotli bundled copy and its reinstall requirement: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-115946 (checked November 1, 2026)
  • CPAN Security Group advisory for CVE-2026-115946, posted to oss-security on October 31, 2026: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/01/1 (checked November 1, 2026)
  • XS-libbrotli 1.2.1.0 changes on MetaCPAN, released October 29, 2026: https://metacpan.org/release/SYBER/XS-libbrotli-1.2.1.0/changes (checked November 1, 2026)